President Macron’s address to the nation
last Sunday evening was, as usual, long on rhetoric and short on detail. Apart
from the announcements of further steps to relax the lockdown and order most
children back to school on June 22nd, there were few clues about the future direction
of economic policy and above all, what, if anything, will be done about the
huge accumulation of debt over the past three months of the crisis. The only clear
promise was that there would no increase in taxes; the French would simply have
to “produce more and work more”.
The economy minister, Bruno le Maire, was
on the radio on Monday morning to fill in a little detail: what the President
meant by the French working more, he explained, was that more of them should be
in work, meaning, presumably, that efforts would continue to reduce
unemployment, but not that each worker, heaven forbid, might have to work longer hours or take
shorter holidays. The overall effect of “more work” would be to increase economic
growth and that this alone would gradually reduce the debt. Without being quite
as severe as Alex Massie, a British journalist who wrote in “The Spectator” the other day about a UK cabinet
minister, that “the spectacle of
intelligent people deliberately peddling nonsense is often aggravating but it’s
rarely as enraging as it is now” , there are several reasons to believe
that such talk is no more than wishful thinking and that, what is more, most
people in France and, more importantly, in its government, don’t take it very
seriously.
The first is the past record of France’s
economic growth and unemployment. Over the past 20 years, basically since the
introduction of the Euro, France’s GDP growth has rarely exceeded 2% a year.
After 2009, when it fell by 2.9%, it has exceeded 2% only twice and has generally
bumped along at about 1% a year. As for unemployment, it has remained stubbornly
high, at around 10% over the same period and only started falling consistently
but slowly, to 8.5%, in 2019. While there is likely to be a spurt of catch-up
growth after the Covid induced downturn, there is little reason to expect
growth rates to double and unemployment to halve in the next few years. Even
less likely considering the amount of new debt that will have to be paid off.
And yet those are the kinds of trends that would be necessary to create real wealth and pay off debt. State intervention in the economy will not make things
any easier. Renault, for instance, of which the state holds 15%, has just been
granted a state guaranteed loan of €5 billion, but on conditions that it does
not close down too many factories in France and lay off too many French workers.
Peugeot, also part owned by the state, was intending to bring to France a few
thousand workers from Poland to help it cope with post Covid demand. In the
face of objections from government and the unions, it has had to scale back the
numbers. Nobody will be surprised at the continuation of the age-old French
tradition of government meddling in industry, either openly or simply by a nod
and a wink to business leaders. Indeed, there are undoubtedly justifiable
reasons for it, but it is hardly compatible with the robust rates of growth
that would be required to put France’s public finances back on an even keel.
The second is the size of France’s debt and
the extent of its social safety net. In his address, President Macron said that
the state has “mobilised” €500 billion to deal with the Covid crisis,
demonstrating, he went on, “the strength of our state and our social model”.
The figure is eye-watering and it covers a multitude of different policies.
Some of it is in the form of state guaranteed loans to companies and industries.
Many of the underlying loans will be repaid one day and the guarantees will not
be needed. Some of it will be invested in research and development, where the
hope is that the eventual return will be higher than the cost of capital. In
addition, some of the extra debt is held, and will continue to be held, on the
balance sheet of the ECB. As long as it stays there, it will not need to be repaid,
and because of low interest rates and the payment of dividends to the state
from the central bank, will cost nothing. The ECB has undertaken to keep that
debt on its balance sheet until the end of 2022, but is likely to be prevailed
upon to extend that term. This nevertheless leaves a sizeable chunk of debt that
has financed, and continues to finance, current spending and that will have to be
paid off: the huge bill for Covid related health spending; the deficit of the
unemployment fund and furlough payments, twice as generous as corresponding
payments in Germany according to an expert on the evening news a few days ago;
the continuing deficit of the still unreformed pension system. And even if
taxes are not raised, they will surely not be lowered and will remain among the
highest of the OECD countries. An instructive case in point is the sinking fund
for social security debt, the CADES (Caisse
d’Amortissement de la Dette Sociale) a kind of bad bank for social debt
that was set up in 1996, siphons off about €16 billion of tax revenue annually
and was supposed to have paid off its €45 billion of outstanding debt by 2009.
Now holding debt of €260 billion, due to be paid off by 2033, it is to be saddled
with an extra €136 billion, according to newspaper reports (notably in “Le Canard Enchainé” of June 10th),
only some of which is Covid related. The tax that funds the repayment of this debt, the CRDS (Contribution pour le Remboursement de la Dette Sociale) is the kind of tax of which finance
ministers dream, with its huge base and very low rate. It will now go on until at
least 2036, continuing to deduct seemingly imperceptible amounts from monthly
pay slips and annual income tax statements, but never making the headlines on
prime-time news or appearing on placards in street demonstrations. In addition to all this existing debt, the health
minister has just announced that a fifth branch of welfare spending, on top of
health, family allowances, pensions and work-related accidents, will be created
to fund social care for the elderly and dependent. Again, a perfectly
respectable and even admirable move given the increasing number of dependent
elderly people and perfectly in line with French people’s expectations of their
generous welfare system, but likely to cost, according to some estimates,
upwards of €30 billion a year for many years to come. Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande
both considered introducing this big dose of additional social spending during
their terms but decided not to go ahead when they found out how much it would
cost. The current government has simply announced this new policy but said nothing,
as yet, about how it will be financed. But, we are assured, no new taxes will be
introduced and existing taxes will not rise. It will all be financed by economic growth.
A further reason, and more insidious consequence
of Covid related spending and the resulting debt, is that it makes it that much
harder for public opinion to believe that money cannot be found for anything. Boris Johnson was wont to say, before the
Covid crisis struck, that there is no such thing as a “magic money tree”. And
yet Macron’s headline figure of €500 billion will make it look to everyone as
if he has conjured up a huge and bountiful one within just three months! The
effect this will have on the presentation and negotiation of future policies is
as yet untested but could be profound. Why quibble, negotiators of pay
increases for health and other front-line workers might argue, about a pay rise
of a mere €200 - €300 a month when the state can find €500 billion within a few
weeks? Why reduce unemployment benefits or curtail furlough payments when the
extra cost is just a few million a year? Even with the highly controversial pension
reform, which may be back on the agenda before the end of the year, it was
estimated by the most militant union leaders that the existing system needed
only €8 billion a year to balance the books. Is this not chickenfeed compared
to €500 billion?
Once again, and probably more urgently than
ever, the sustainability of France’s generous welfare system is on the line.
Nobody really knows what overall impact this vast run-up in debt will have in
the longer term and in the absence of meaningful reform. The ECB will
eventually hit the limits of expanding its balance sheet and when it does, long
term interest rates will rise. Some economists believe that the headlong money
creation of the last three months can lead only to monetary inflation or to the
formation of bubbles in real estate or financial assets or both. When these
bubbles eventually and inevitably burst, the impact can be cataclysmic, as we
witnessed at the bursting of the “tech bubble” in 2000 or the “subprime” crisis
of 2008. However, it seems fairly safe to assume that when these things
actually happen, Emmanuel Macron will have long since left the Elysée Palace,
even if he is elected for a second term, and today’s crop of militant union leaders
will have been replaced by perhaps even more militant ones. By that time, my
four grandchildren, all of them currently under twelve, will be at university or
in further training and looking for their first job.
So, what else is new? Or as the French
might put it, “plus ça change, plus c’est
la même chose”.